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I. INTRODUCTION
As the Internet has become more prevalent over the past couple of
decades, misuse of the Internet for criminal and terrorist activity has led
American government officials to endeavor to improve their ability to deal
with these threats. Criminal use of the Internet to take advantage of the
government’s limitations and circumvent traditional government phone
wiretaps has inspired the Obama administration to create a task force led by
officials from the Justice and Commerce Departments, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (“FBI”), and other agencies.1 The goal of the task force is
to expand the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act
(“CALEA”), which was passed in 1994 to regulate telephone and
broadband companies to ensure compliance with standards “so that they
can begin conducting surveillance of a target immediately after being
presented with a court order.”2
President Obama’s task force intends to add provisions to CALEA
that would allow the government to require “all services that enable
communications – including encrypted e-mail transmitters like BlackBerry,
social networking Web sites like Facebook and software that allows direct
‘peer to peer’ messaging like Skype – to be technically capable of
complying if served with a wiretap order.”3 The expansion of CALEA
would likely widen its scope to social networking sites, instant messaging,
1. Wiretapping and Other Eavesdropping Devices and Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
2010, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/w/wiretapping_and_other
_eavesdropping_devices_and_methods/index.html.
2. Id.; Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006).
3. Charlie Savage, U.S. Tries to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap.html? pagewanted=all
[hereinafter Savage Sept. 27].
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gaming consoles that allow conversation among multiple players, and to
word processing software that allows communication through Internet
4
access.
CALEA was first passed to require telephone and broadband
companies to construct services that enable efficient and prompt
compliance with wiretap orders. While the FCC has previously interpreted
this 1994 version of CALEA to require compliance by communications
5
over the Internet using Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (“VoIP”) technology,
the expansion to all Internet communications would have significant
consequences for the use of the Internet as we know it. The unique
architecture of the Internet lends it to particular vulnerabilities with the
consequence that an expansion of CALEA to all Internet communications
would create problems regarding the innovative nature of the Internet as
well as national security concerns. The proposed expansion of CALEA also
raises free speech and privacy issues.
This Note will examine the competing interests related to expanding
CALEA and will weigh the potential benefits and consequences of CALEA
to conclude that substantially more information is needed to justify a
change. Part II will give a background of wiretap and surveillance law, and
establish the role of CALEA within the scope of this field of law. Part III
will lay out the expansion proposal and the proposed requirements, in
addition to discussing the reaction of online companies to the expansion
thus far.
Part IV will discuss the relationship between the government and
online companies. While the Internet was created by the U.S. government,
this section will outline how once the Internet was beginning to be utilized
by the public and other countries, the government allowed industry to take
over primary control, while the government took a regulatory role. The
status of this relationship has changed more recently, with a growing
partnership between the government and the private sector. This section
will discuss the potential implications of that development.
Part V will look at many of the arguments made against the expansion
by opponents to the proposal. This examination will demonstrate that there
are interests of the American public at stake. The CALEA expansion would
likely have a negative impact on the use of the Internet as a means of
4. Laura W. Murphy & Christopher Calabrese, Going Dark: Lawful Electronic
Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies, ACLU 3 (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ACLU_Statement_for_the_Record_On_Proposed_Updates
_to_the_Communications_Assistance_to_Law_Enforcement_Act_CALEA.pdf.
5. Susan Landau, National Security on the Line, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
409, 410 (2006).
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communication, and would create the danger of chilling public speech.
Another interest that will be discussed is the danger to Fourth Amendment
privacy rights of Americans due to both the propensity of Internet users to
reveal more information about themselves online, and the potential
vulnerabilities of CALEA software, which could create the potential for
access by third parties. The design of the Internet will also be discussed to
demonstrate that the suggested change in CALEA would have implications
for the Internet as it is currently structured, as well as national security
concerns. This section will then discuss the potential economic and
innovative issues which could arise, indicating that a change in the law
would potentially have a negative impact on booming Internet industries.
Part V will conclude by discussing the impact that the proposal would have
internationally, both through the danger of any newly-developed software’s
use by foreign governments and the impact of the requirements of the law
on foreign companies.
Part VI of this Note will then examine the counterarguments to these
concerns, outlining the government interests behind the CALEA proposal.
The government’s argument that the expansion of the Act would not
correlate to an expansion of government authority will first be examined,
followed by a discussion of the government interest in preventing and
investigating crime. The last section of Part VI will respond to national
security arguments made against the proposal, arguing that current services
to implement wiretaps retroactively have a greater likelihood of creating
security holes for hackers than the proposed CALEA software.
Part VII will establish that in spite of relevant government interests
advanced by the CALEA proposal, there is not enough information about
why the government truly needs the services to justify the dangers that
could arise. The potential costs are too great for the government to have
free reign with expanding CALEA, and the FBI should either continue to
use their powers under current wiretap laws to the best of their abilities, or
give substantially more information to the American public about why such
a change would be warranted. Even if the government presents further
information about why such measures are needed, it is unlikely that the
government interests will be found to outweigh the disadvantages to the
American public. The FBI would then be recommended to proceed to the
best of its abilities while utilizing its current capabilities.

II. HISTORY OF WIRETAP AND SURVEILLANCE LAW
Although the government has used wiretaps for law enforcement for
over a century, Congress first regulated their use in the 1968 Omnibus
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6

Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. Title III of this Act permitted and
closely regulated use of wiretaps for investigations of criminal activity, and
Congress regulated government wiretapping in international investigations
through the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.7 Over time, as
technology has advanced, the law has similarly needed to change to stay
relevant.
CALEA was passed in 1994 to require telephone and broadband
companies to specifically construct their services to efficiently comply with
8
wiretap orders. The passing of CALEA represented a departure from
previous wiretap law due to the government’s use of its authority to
9
establish the precise way that telephone networks should be designed. As
discussed further in Part IV, the legislation that ruled how communications
providers would develop their networks demonstrates a growing
relationship between the state and the private sector with regard to the
Internet and wiretapping. According to Sun Microsystems Laboratories
engineer Susan Landau, before CALEA, the government had “left the
design of wiretap technology to the people who developed and ran the
communications technology,” rather than instructing communications
providers on the specifics of how to configure their systems.10
As the market for traditional telephone systems began to decline with
the advent of VoIP communications, the FBI found that it was unable to
wiretap significant quantities of American telephonic communications and
petitioned the FCC to interpret CALEA in a way which would expand it to
include the authority of the government to regulate VoIP communications
11
as well. In 2004, the FCC complied with the FBI’s request and
controversially extended CALEA’s power.12 Much of the debate
surrounding the FCC’s decision to broaden CALEA had to do with the
legitimacy of the FCC’s power to interpret CALEA beyond what many
believed the legislative intent entailed.13 Critics had also questioned the
FCC decision in light of the substantial threats that requiring wiretap
14
capability would impose on innovation, privacy, and security. Many of
the concerns aired in response to the FCC’s 2004 decision are still
6. Id. at 409.
7. Id. at 409–10.
8. Wiretapping and Other Eavesdropping Devices and Methods, supra note 1.
9. See Landau, supra note 5, at 417.
10. Id.; see Constance L. Martin, Exalted Technology: Should CALEA Be Expanded to
Authorize Internet Wiretapping?, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 140, 144–45 (2005).
11. Landau, supra note 5, at 410.
12. Id. at 421–22.
13. See Martin, supra note 10.
14. Landau, supra note 5, at 410.

376

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64

substantially relevant and apply fully to the potential expansion of CALEA
to all Internet communications.
The controversy surrounding the FCC’s decision led to a D.C. Circuit
Court case, which upheld the FCC’s authority to interpret CALEA to
15
include VoIP. When the FCC interpreted CALEA to include VoIP, the
rest of Internet communications were intentionally excluded as beyond the
16
scope of the Act. The contemporary expansion of CALEA that the
Obama administration is promoting, in addition to creating new powers for
law enforcement to wiretap communications over the Internet, would
further endorse the FCC’s interpretive power and endorse the use of
wiretaps for VoIP communications.

III. PROPOSED EXPANSION OF CALEA
The amendment of CALEA to enable wiretapping of all Internet
communications would likely involve an expansion of existing provisions
that include specific changes that companies would need to make in order
for their services to be wiretap-capable. Requirements for companies would
potentially include:
• “Communications services that encrypt messages must have a
17
way to unscramble them.”
• “Foreign-based providers that do business inside the United
States must install a domestic office capable of performing
18
intercepts.”
• “Developers of software that enables peer-to-peer
communication must redesign their service to allow
19
interception.”
• Provisions for a fine or penalty for failure to comply.20
In addition, CALEA would likely be amended to be written in
“technologically neutral” terms to prevent its requirements from becoming
21
obsolete. These provisions would have consequences for the ability of the
government to wiretap, the method in which Internet communications

15. Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
16. Martin, supra note 10, at 155.
17. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3; see also Charlie Savage, FBI Seeks Wider Wiretap
Law for Web, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 11/17/technology/
17wiretap.html?_r=1&ref=wiretapping_and_other_eavesdropping_ devices_and_methods
[hereinafter Savage Nov. 16].
18. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3; Savage Nov. 16, supra note 17.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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services run their organizations, and the privacy and freedom of speech of
the American people.
In spite of the consequences that the expansion of CALEA would
have, there was no public response from online companies after the Obama
22
administration declared its intentions. Companies such as Google,
Facebook, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Research in Motion, who are “never shy
23
about issuing press releases,” were all silent in response to the plan. The
companies, which are normally strongly defensive of their privacy records
and the privacy rights of their users, presented a front of silence, with the
exception of Facebook’s comment that “‘[w]e will examine any proposal
when and if it materializes but we can’t comment on something we haven’t
seen. Generally, it’s our policy to only comply with valid, legal requests for
data.”24
It has been speculated that the online companies have not responded
to the declaration because the Obama administration has not offered
25
specifics for the companies to comment on. Yet the executives of a
number of technology firms and Google and Facebook met with Robert S.
Mueller III, the director of the FBI, on November 15, 2010, to discuss “a
proposal to make it easier to wiretap Internet users.”26 The way the wiretap
proposal was received was not clear as the online companies have not
publicly discussed the matter, and it is, therefore, unknown what they
would think about the potential expansion of CALEA.

IV. GROWTH OF THE INTERNET AND THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
ONLINE COMPANIES
As is hinted by the meeting between the online companies and the
FBI director regarding the expansion of wiretap capabilities to the Internet,
the relationship between the private sector and the government has
strengthened in the recent past with regard to the Internet. Although the
authority to wiretap the Internet already exists, CALEA does not apply to
online companies, and many of them wait until they are served with
wiretap orders before developing interception capabilities.27 The potential
expansion of CALEA represents a trend of increased participation between
22. Verne G. Kopytoff, Internet Wiretapping Proposal Met with Silence, N.Y. TIMES
BITS BLOG, Sept. 28, 2010, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/internet-wiretappingproposal-met-with-silence/.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Savage Nov. 16, supra note 17.
27. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3.
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the government and the private sector with regard to the Internet, which has
potential adverse consequences.

A.

History of the Relationship

While many view the Internet as a “grassroots” innovation, the
Internet was originally created by American military strategists and was
28
only later privatized. In 1958, the United States Department of Defense
created the Advanced Research Project Agency (“ARPA”), an agency to
29
ARPA funded university and
sponsor military research projects.
corporate programs “concerning the creation of a computer network to
access and share data and programs among computers located in different
places.”30 As the development of the project began during the Cold War, its
appeal was that during large-scale international conflicts it could guarantee
secure control over information transfers.31 ARPANET, the precursor of
the Internet, was designed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology
32
researcher Lawrence G. Roberts in 1966. In October 1969, the first “hostto-host message” was sent from the University of California at Los Angeles
to the Stanford Research Institute, and, over time, nodes were added to
expand the network.33
ARPANET’s single network and few dozen nodes developed into the
Internet over the course of a decade, becoming “a system of many
34
interconnected networks, capable of almost indefinite expansion.” The
Department of Defense initially continued to be heavily involved in the
emergence of the Internet by “funding research and development,
transferring technology to operational forces, using its financial resources
to shape the commercial market for network products, and exercising
management control over the ARPANET and its community of users.”35
While the government never truly released all of its relationship with the
Internet, for a time it backed off controlling and running the Internet and

28. Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, paras. 2, 24
(2003).
29. ROMUALDO PASTOR-SATORRAS & ALESSANDRO VESPIGNANI, EVOLUTION AND
STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNET: A STATISTICAL PHYSICS APPROACH xiii, 2 (2004).
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id.
34. JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET 113 (1999).
35. Id. at 114.
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instead “focused on its regulatory role of shaping the rules that govern
36
Internet-related activities.”
Not long after its government origins, the Internet was broadly viewed
37
in the 1980s and 1990s as representing the decline of the State. The
Internet is a “decentralized network that derived its resilience from the
absence of a central command,” and many believed that control of it by a
particular government would be unmanageable.38 While the Internet was
originally understood by some to be a “post-national situation” whose
advent was confronted with “mourning or celebrating” the “inevitable
sidelining of the State,” the growing relationship between the government
and online corporations suggests that this view is mistaken.39
In recent years, since the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S.
government has started to reclaim some control over Internet operations
40
through growing collaboration with private online companies. Legislation
was passed following the September 11th tragedy that increased the
authority of the federal government to participate in the realm of the
Internet, and the government has principally increased its power of
41
electronic communication interception and collection. Some argue that
the government is regaining control by taking over “ready-made, often
quite-centralized, private nodes of power” through both recruitment and, in
many cases, voluntary action by the private companies.42

B.

Cooperation of the FBI and Online Companies

The FBI has recently developed a “Going Dark Program” to improve
its ability to perform electronic surveillance, particularly in light of what it
says are difficulties in obtaining wiretap capabilities efficiently from some
companies.43 Under current systems, some communications carriers have
been unable to carry out wiretap orders. One of the difficulties law
enforcement has faced with Internet wiretapping is that one of the major
American communications carriers failed to carry out over one hundred
44
wiretap orders from 2008 to 2009 due to an eight-month lapse. After the
36. Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 28, at para. 2.
37. Id. at para. 1.
38. Id. at paras. 1, 45.
39. Id. at para. 1.
40. Id. at para. 83.
41. Id. at paras. 83–84.
42. Id. at para. 2.
43. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3; Charlie Savage, Officials to Push to Bolster Law on
Wiretapping, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/
us/19wiretap.html [hereinafter Savage Oct. 19].
44. Savage Oct. 19, supra note 43.
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first lapse was fixed, the carrier again experienced difficulties, which
45
prevented electronic surveillance interception for another nine days. In
2009, another major carrier dealt with similar interruptions “ranging from
nine days to six weeks and was unable to comply with 14 wiretap
orders.”46 Many of the interruptions were seen to be caused by upgrades
made to networks, and the FBI sent engineers to help the companies
address the problems.47 Along with sending engineers to assist companies,
every year the FBI spends around $20 million to assist private companies
with fixing network problems that interfere with the FBI’s electronic
surveillance capabilities.48
In addition to FBI participation in network problems, further
cooperation between the government and the private online companies has
occurred through direct voluntary participation of companies with the
government. Joseph E. Sullivan, Director of Compliance and Law
Enforcement Relations at eBay, has “offered to hand over information,
when requested, without a subpoena.”49 This is significant as the eBay
corporation controls a colossal amount of information, including “financial
records, names, user IDs and passwords, affiliations, e-mail addresses,
physical addresses, shipping information, contact information, and
transaction information” for eBay and PayPal.50 Many other companies
have adopted similar law enforcement-friendly policies, and have been met
with similar responses: “[w]hether the Big Brother we distrust is
government and its agencies, or multinational corporations, the emerging
collaboration between the two in the online environment produces the
ultimate threat.”51
This sentiment has been echoed in testimony from the American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) submitted to the House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security on February 17, 2011, in an
examination of the proposal of the CALEA expansion. The ACLU argued
that the proposal would mean “a dramatic expansion of a dangerous idea”
that the private sector and online companies would have the power to build
52
the government’s surveillance structure.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 28, at para. 3.
Id.
Id.
Murphy & Calabrese, supra note 4, at 3.
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Compliance with CALEA

Further development of the relationship between the government and
the private sector online companies can be shown through the enactment of
the “safe harbor” provision under CALEA. The current provision states that
if a particular communications carrier meets industry standards, it will be
considered in compliance.53 The standard required includes “providing the
content of a call or e-mail, along with identifying information like its
recipient, time and location,” and failure to meet this standard could lead to
fines imposed by a judge or the FCC.54 In spite of these strict standards,
many law enforcement officials admit that “neither option is ever invoked”
because the government prefers to foster the government relationship with
industry rather than file complaints against companies.55 The emphasis of
the government on the industry relationship—rather than improving
capabilities—can be argued to “create an incentive to let problems linger:
Once a carrier’s interception capability is restored -- even if it was fixed at
taxpayer expense -- its service is compliant again with the 1994 law, so the
issue is moot.”56
Company compliance with the law has been rather difficult to
establish in the first place, demonstrating the potential failures of CALEA
to have beneficial results for law enforcement. When CALEA was
originally enacted in 1994, compliance by telephone and communications
carriers was so difficult that the FCC extended the original date for
57
compliance by two years. In spite of the extension, four years after the
date set for compliance, there continued to be “frequent allegations of
58
There was a hearing House Subcommittee on
noncompliance.”
Telecommunications and the Internet hearing in 2004 to discuss the lack of
full CALEA implementation, during which “spokespersons for the FBI and
DOJ stated that many companies still do not comply with CALEA,
primarily because of inadequate technology.”59
In a Department of Justice audit report, it has also been noted that the
costs of implementation had been much higher than estimated, and it was
significant that “the FBI could not show the extent to which inability to

53. Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006); see
Wiretapping and Other Eavesdropping Devices and Methods, supra note 1.
54. Wiretapping and Other Eavesdropping Devises and Methods, supra note 1.
55. Id.
56. Savage Oct. 19, supra note 43.
57. Martin, supra note 10, at 145–46.
58. Id. at 146.
59. Id. at 146 n.35.
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implement CALEA had negatively affected FBI surveillance.” The goal
of compliance was unsuccessful in spite of the $500 million authorized by
CALEA for reasonable cost reimbursement for carriers and the threat of a
fine for each noncomplying carrier of up to $10,000 each.61 The difficulties
faced by companies attempting to achieve compliance raises questions as to
whether government-required system changes are the most effective
method for law enforcement to increase their ability to wiretap suspects
that are Internet users.

D.

Implications of a Strong Relationship Between the Government
and the Private Sector

While a strengthened relationship between the government and
private industry with regard to the Internet could potentially be the answer
to solving compliance problems with wiretap orders, this relationship also
poses a threat to American industry. The development of CALEA was a
departure from previous law due to its requirement that companies follow
government-directed approaches to configure their networks to comply
with wiretap orders. The growth of the government-industry collaboration,
signified by this change, could pose a danger to the online environment,62
both as a threat to individual freedom and as an unwelcome influence on
63
the development of technology and code.
Landau argues that the deviation from previous law that CALEA
represents is problematic due to the imposition on providers of a plan for
how technical networks should work. Landau points out that “[i]n no
instance prior to CALEA did Congress legislate how the communications
providers should configure their networks; instead, Congress left the design
of wiretap technology to the people who developed and ran the
64
communications technology.” Landau also argues that it would make
more sense to leave the discretion about network configuration to the
providers themselves in order to best balance the needs of law enforcement
and the privacy needs of customers through use of market forces.65 The
existence of market forces put communications carriers “in a natural
position to balance the opposing needs of law enforcement and customer

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Martin, supra note 10, at 146 n.34 (citation omitted).
Id. at 145–46.
Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 28, at para. 3.
Id. at paras. 20–21.
Landau, supra note 5, at 417.
See id.
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privacy,” and the industry itself should therefore be in charge of how
66
networks are configured to comply with CALEA.

V. CONCERNS OF INTERNET WIRETAPS IN THE FACE OF AN
EXPANDING CALEA
In addition to reservations about the application of current CALEA
law and the consequences of the relationship between the government and
the private sector, there are similar concerns about the expansion of
CALEA and the ramifications it would have for American citizens, online
communications providers, and the Internet. Such fears have to do with
concerns about CALEA’s impact on the First Amendment right to freedom
of speech and the Fourth Amendment right to privacy, as well as whether
CALEA’s implementation would affect national security. There are also
potential issues regarding the Internet’s economic impact and whether its
innovative powers would be adversely altered by CALEA software. The
final concern in the face of CALEA is the impact it would have
internationally, both on citizens of other countries and on foreign
corporations. Due to the nature of these concerns, the government should
provide more information and evaluate the competing interests at hand in
order to best serve the American public.

A.

Design of the Internet

The structure of the Internet raises relevant concerns due to the impact
that allowing the installation of access points would have on the Internet
itself. James X. Dempsey, Vice President of the Center for Democracy and
Technology, argues that the CALEA proposal would have “‘huge
implications’ and challenge[] ‘fundamental elements of the Internet
revolution’ – including its decentralized design.”67 The “hub-and-spoke”
design of phone and broadband communication contrasts strongly with the
decentralized design of the Internet, meaning that there could be serious
consequences in attempts to require wiretap technology for the Internet.68 If
“requiring Internet providers to be able to unscramble encrypted messages
or intercept any transmitted communication also calls for them to function
like centralized carriers, the shift will reverse what made the Internet – and
69
made it a fount of economic growth.” The expansion of CALEA could,

66. Id.
67. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3.
68. Editorial, Major Technical Difficulties, N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/opinion/03wed1.html.
69. Id.

TIMES,

Nov.

2,

2010,
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therefore, have significant ramifications for the structure of the Internet in
general.
Substantially different than the hub-and-spoke design of phone and
70
broadband, the Internet is a “packet-switched” network. This means that
there are no fixed circuits created as pathways for a particular
communication and the data is instead divided into packets to be
communicated.71 Each individual packet then travels via the leastcongested route to later be reassembled at the other end.72 This frequently
means that the packets travel together, but sometimes the packets are
73
separated during transit. As the system is created to allow packets to
travel separately, it would be increasingly difficult for a wiretap system to
intercept the information anywhere other than at the endpoints.74
According to Landau, the design of the Internet means that “‘unless the
communication is tapped at the endpoints . . . it’s impossible to guarantee
100 percent access to all communication packets.”75 Wiretaps on a
traditional Public Switch Telephone Network create switches somewhere
between each end, but the structure of the Internet therefore requires a
different approach for an effective wiretap.76 An additional problem is that
“[a]s the choke point for communications comes closer to the source of the
77
communications, the risk of detection becomes greater.” CALEA
wiretaps thus far have required that their providers ensure that their
information be sent over a specific switch somewhere in the middle for
government access.78 As it is difficult to guarantee access to all information
unless the wiretap is at the endpoint of a communication, traditional
wiretaps may be unable to obtain sought-after information.
The architecture of the Internet also lends itself to vulnerabilities and
makes it more difficult to wiretap. Professor Steven Bellovin of Columbia
University argues that the proposed expansion would require a different
and more complicated protocol, which would create serious security

70. Landau, supra note 5, at 424.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Gene D. Park, Note, Internet Wiretaps: Applying the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act to Broadband Services, 2 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y
599, 615 (2006).
75. Id. (footnote omitted).
76. Timothy Singleton, Big Brother Hears You, but Can He Understand What He
Hears? The Problematic Application of CALEA to VoIP Communications in the Age of
Encryption, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 283, 286–88 (2008).
77. Id. at 307.
78. Id. at 288.
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problems. The Internet is easier to undermine than a telephone network
due to its “flexibility and dynamism,” and creating access points within the
Internet would “build security vulnerabilities into the communication
protocols.”80 Professor Bellovin stated that “many previous attempts to add
such features have resulted in new, easily exploited security flaws rather
81
than better law enforcement access.”
There is also little proof that software creating access points would be
82
safeguarded against abuse. As a Greek form of wiretapping that similarly
created online access points was previously exploited, creating a significant
threat to national security, it appears that the fears of those opposing
CALEA may have valid foundations. In 2005, hackers broke through a
Greek legally-mandated wiretap function to gain access to communications
of government officials.83 It was eventually discovered that over “100 highranking government officials and dignitaries including the prime minister
of Greece, his wife, and the Mayor of Athens” had their phones
compromised and conversations overheard through manipulation of the
Vodafone Greece network.84 The bugging began sometime before the 2004
Olympic Games in Athens and remained undiscovered until January 24,
85
2005. Not only is it worrisome that the hackers remained undiscovered
for so long, but even more concerning is that the only reason they were
ever discovered at all was that the hackers added something to the software
that blocked delivery of text messages, leading technicians to check if
anyone was listening in the “electronic back door.”86 The scope of the
information obtained by the hackers and what it was used for was never
discovered, but “no other computer crime on record has had the same
potential for capturing information about affairs of state.”87
The American system would have similar vulnerabilities if wiretap
capabilities were inserted into the networks of communications carriers,
and it has been specifically alleged that retrofitted “CALEA installations
are poorly maintained, lacking adequate security measures such as a
79. Murphy & Calabrese, supra note 4, at 5.
80. Landau, supra note 5, at 426.
81. Murphy & Calabrese, supra note 4, at 5.
82. John Markoff, Engineers as Counterspies: How the Greek Cellphone System Was
TIMES
BITS
BLOG
(July
10,
2007,
7:40
AM),
Bugged,
N.Y.
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/engineers-as-counterspys-how-the-greekcellphone-system-was-bugged/.
83. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3.
84. Markoff, supra note 82.
85. Vassilis Prevelakis & Diomidis Spinellis, The Athens Affair, IEEE SPECTRUM (July
2007), http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-athens-affair.
86. Markoff, supra note 82.
87. Prevelakis & Spinellis, supra note 85.
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firewall, and are open to hacking.” There are also potential security risks
with Internet wiretapping because the packets of information obtained
through Internet wiretapping are then shipped via the Internet to a third
party.89 This system would allow an insider the access and capability to
90
retrieve unauthorized information without being discovered.
The possibility that building an access point for the FBI to wiretap
communications might also be a weakness for hackers to exploit is a
91
potential national security problem. Landau argues that this technology
“presents a fat target for foreign intelligence agencies,” giving them the
capability of broad access to American Internet communications without
needing to build any access points of their own.92 She says that “[w]ere
Internet wiretapping technology to be penetrated and exploited by foreign
intelligence services, massive surveillance of U.S. ‘persons’ (citizens and
corporations) might follow.”93 This level of potential breach could be
devastating for the well-being of American corporations as well as the
safety of American citizens.

B.

Fourth Amendment Privacy Concerns

Beyond traditional concerns with law enforcement wiretapping, the
implementation of Internet wiretaps poses additional privacy
considerations. The expansion of CALEA would not change the
government’s capabilities of obtaining warrants under existing wiretap law,
but privacy interests would still be threatened through the creation of
“access points” by law enforcement.94 Much of the additional concern for
application of wiretaps to the Internet has to do with the particularities of
the Internet that would make it possible for a third party to find access to
private information through the access points.95 The Internet’s
decentralized and open features combined with the fact that it involves
distribution of data packets over networks “presents difficulties in isolating
specific communications directed for extraction under a court order.”96
Access points created to enable law enforcement to wiretap the Internet
could very possibly “also allow unauthorized access into private

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Park, supra note 74, at 619 (citation omitted).
Landau, supra note 5, at 432.
Id.
Martin, supra note 10, at 176.
Landau, supra note 5, at 432–33.
Id. at 433.
Park, supra note 74, at 613.
Id. at 603.
Id.

Number 2]

WIRETAPPING THE INTERNET

387

97

communications.” This privacy concern was also an issue with the
expansion of CALEA by the FCC to apply to VoIP communications, but it
is even more relevant to a potential decision to expand easy access for
wiretap capabilities to all Internet communications.
The concerns of allowing easy access points over the Internet for all
online communications companies instills further concern due to the fact
that people reveal more of themselves online than over telephone
conversations.98 Privacy advocates argue that the Internet should be subject
to different treatment than phone networks due to the fact that the Internet
99
Susan
provides an entirely different medium of communication.
Freiwald, Professor at the University of San Francisco School of Law,
argues:
[W]e reveal more of ourselves online than on the telephone, because
we are more clearly identified with our Internet activities via our
password-protected accounts. We transmit much richer information
online than offline; in addition to conversations, we send pictures,
videos, songs, and long documents. We also create records of our
100
activities when we shop, read, play, organize, and date online.

As Freiwald’s argument demonstrates, average Americans reveal
more of themselves online because the medium allows for a variety of
different types of communication. The risk is, therefore, that the
government will have access to substantially more information than it
would with a telephone wiretap. As pointed out by Democratic Senator
Ron Wyden of Oregon in response to the FCC’s expansive interpretation of
CALEA, “[i]t’s possible to fight terrorism ferociously without gutting civil
liberties. The challenge in striking that balance is to have ground rules.”101
Fears surrounding Americans’ privacy concerns regarding
unauthorized wiretaps have been validated by previous government action.
The Bush administration amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (“FISA”) in 2008, which “sanctioned spying without a warrant,
102
without suspicion, and without court approval.” The law was amended in
order to retroactively give legal cover to over five years of spying through
illegal wiretaps by the government.103 While the expansion of CALEA is
not for a similar retroactive protection, “the risks of executive overreach
97. Id.
98. Id. at 613 (citing Susan Friewald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of
the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 77 (2004)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Martin, supra note 10, at 180.
102. Editorial, supra note 68.
103. Id.
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are still there.” The argument has been made that Congress should be
especially careful in drafting any new provisions for CALEA in order to
delineate what powers are given to the executive branch, such that the
scope of the law will not “spread far beyond what’s said to be
105
contemplated.”
Additional privacy concerns exist due to the Supreme Court decision
in Bartnicki v. Vopper, which indicates that newspapers and publishers can,
in some situations, escape criminal liability that would otherwise arise from
106
publishing illegally intercepted conversations. The Supreme Court held
that “privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in
107
publishing matters of public importance.” As Internet wiretaps provide
vulnerabilities, which could be taken advantage of by third parties, the
ability of the media to potentially publish material obtained illegally
without facing government sanctions further heightens this threat to
American privacy.
A privacy advocacy group, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, is
concerned that there are “obvious civil liberty and privacy issues” with the
Obama administration plan to expand CALEA.108 It argues that the existing
statutes for wiretap orders give law enforcement agencies sufficient reign
to have access to Internet communication information.109 It also argues that
the reason for the expansion of the law is that the government does not get
the information as quickly as it would wish, and that the government
should have to “bear the burden of proof for why [the government] need[s]
110
this,” although in most circumstances it tends not to be required. The
Obama administration should therefore provide more information to justify
such threats to Americans’ rights.

C.

Threat to the First Amendment Freedom of Speech

Among the extensive concerns regarding application of CALEA to all
Internet companies is the potential threat to speech it would impose.
Privacy advocates argue that the plan would be a threat to First
Amendment freedom of speech protections and that the installation of
wiretap capabilities within Internet communications provider networks

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
Id. at 534.
Kopytoff, supra note 22.
Id.
Id.
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would be readily open to abuse. Due to the potential for abuse of the
proposed wiretap capabilities, there is an inherent fear that chilling of
speech could occur.
There are two types of chilling effects: one that chills illegal conduct
when a government policy or statute prohibits it, and one “when
individuals seeking to engage in lawful activity are deterred from doing so
112
by a government regulation not specifically directed at that activity.”
This second form of chilling effect is extremely harmful to both the
individual deterred from exercising his or her rights and to society in
general.113 The First Amendment has been considered to be “based on the
assumption, perhaps unprovable, that the uninhibited exchange of
information, the active search for truth, and the open criticism of
government are positive virtues.”114 Some argue that the level of impact of
the chilling effect depends on the fear associated with the potential
chilling.115 In the case of Internet wiretaps, the fear that private information
communicated to other parties could be intercepted by the government or
hackers could cause pervasive anxiety.
The interference with online speech is alarming due to the immense
benefits provided by anonymity in particular. The Supreme Court has said
that protections for anonymous speech epitomize the purpose behind the
First Amendment: “to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation—and
116
their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.” In
some cases, anonymity on the Internet is critical due to the sensitive nature
of material being shared by online speakers such as whistleblowers and
human rights workers struggling against repressive regimes.117 The Internet
is touted for its propensity to allow people to interact online anonymously
and to encourage people to be able to say anything they wish without fear
of repercussion.118 It has also been described as “one of the greatest tools
for exercising an individual’s constitutional rights.”119 If CALEA is
amended, people will feel less secure in the anonymity of online forums
111. Id.
112. Gayle Horn, Note, Online Searches and Offline Challenges: The Chilling Effect,
Anonymity and the New FBI Guidelines, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 735, 749 (2005).
113. Id. at 749–50.
114. Id. at 750 (quoting Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and The First Amendment:
Unraveling the ‘Chilling Effect,’ 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978)).
115. Id.
116. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
117. Anonymity, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, http://www.eff.org/issues/
anonymity (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
118. Id.; see also Murphy & Calabrese, supra note 4, at 4.
119. Murphy & Calabrese, supra note 4, at 4.
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and online communication, and the abundant flow of speech on the Internet
could be chilled.
Those who argue against an anonymous Internet point out that online
anonymity creates opportunities for crime and harassment to go
120
Anonymity is sometimes said to allow people to avoid
unpunished.
taking responsibility for their communications and to encourage things like
“offensive or defamatory newsgroup postings, or sexually harassing email.”121 Although anonymity has been blamed for allowing anonymous
speakers to be “hit-and-run drivers on the infobahn,”122 the disadvantages
caused by its abuse do not outweigh its significant benefits.

D.

Economic and Innovation Concerns

There are concerns with regard to the well-being of industry and the
innovation of online companies related to the CALEA proposal. One of the
first issues is that much of the cost would be covered by the online
companies themselves. According to former Justice Department lawyer
Michael A. Sussmann, the CALEA expansion proposal would lead to a
“technology and security headache” because of the hassles of
implementation, and “the investigative burden and costs will shift to
providers.”123
There is also evidence that the consequential implementation of the
proposal would discourage innovation and impede production. Landau
argued that the proposal would be particularly detrimental to small startups,
as “[e]very engineer who is developing the wiretap system is an engineer
who is not building in greater security, more features, or getting the product
124
out faster.” The fear that the proposal will interfere with innovation of
online companies is similarly shared by a number of other critics, as well as
125
When the FCC initially
the Departments of Commerce and State.
interpreted CALEA to expand its scope beyond how it had been used to
apply to VoIP, there was speculation that the FCC would institute a preapproval system for technology, “requiring submission to and approval by
the FCC.”126 Although the request was not granted for the system at the
time, the implementation of Internet wiretaps would impose a hindrance on
120. George P. Long, III, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U.
PITT. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1994).
121. Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR.
L. REV. 117, 119 (1996).
122. Id.
123. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3.
124. Id.
125. Savage Nov. 16, supra note 17; Martin, supra note 10, at 175.
126. Martin, supra note 10, at 176.
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innovation of telecommunications technologies. Landau points out that
innovators would no longer “be able to have an idea, develop it, and go to
the market; instead, early on, they would need to consult with the FBI.
They would need lawyers and lobbyists—and time.”128 Such a requirement
would definitely interfere with innovative processes, which in turn could
threaten national security due to the importance of maintaining the United
States’ scientific and industrial strength.129
The threat to innovation could also cripple the position of American
products within the global market. This was a fear of encryption makers in
the late 1990s, which is renewed today in light of the CALEA proposal, as
many believe that forcing regulations on U.S.-developed technology would
drive the market for innovation overseas.130

E.

International Impact

The expansion of CALEA would also have a significant international
impact, both through software implementation by foreign governments and
the impact on international communication and international commerce.
The technologies developed to carry out the CALEA orders could be
utilized by other governments in ways that remove or diminish the privacy
of their citizens on the Internet. Even the Departments of Commerce and
State have expressed fear131 that such technologies would be “used by
repressive regimes to hunt for political dissidents.”132
Foreign corporations would also be impacted by the CALEA
expansion as the government would require them to comply with the law
through the services they provide to American consumers. Affected
companies might include Research in Motion (the Canadian maker of
BlackBerry devices) and others that have services based overseas.133
Overseas-based services would have to change the design of their systems
so that messages could be intercepted and unscrambled and would
therefore “have to route communications through a server on United States
134
soil where they could be wiretapped.”
The expansion of CALEA would therefore have significant
international impact, which would not only encourage repressive actions by
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Landau, supra note 5, at 428.
Id.
Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3; Martin, supra note 10, at 179.
Savage Nov. 16, supra note 17.
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foreign regimes but would also unfavorably constrain international
companies and service providers to the requirements of the law.

VI. REASONS GIVEN FOR EXPANDING CALEA
Those opposed to CALEA have presented extensive arguments
detailing the dangers of the proposal, to which the FBI and the Obama
administration have, to some extent, countered to defend their position. The
government argues that as the expansion of CALEA is within the scope of
its current authority under wiretap law and that it does not create danger to
the magnitude that its opponents allege; the CALEA expansion is,
therefore, needed to serve the government interest in preventing and
investigating crime.

A.

Within Scope of Government Authority

In response to the arguments that the proposal of the Obama
administration to expand CALEA is unwise and likely to cause an
abundance of problems, the FBI argues that the proposal would not have
detrimental consequences because it is not an expansion of law
enforcement authority to wiretap. The CALEA provisions do not affect the
legality of wiretaps nor the requirements imposed on law enforcement
officials for obtaining wiretap orders. Valerie E. Caproni, General Counsel
to the FBI, stated that the expansion would address lawfully authorized
intercepts and that the FBI is promoting the expanded CALEA provisions
to preserve the “ability to execute our existing authority in order to protect
the public safety and national security.”135 The government argues these
provisions are merely an attempt to keep up with criminal and terrorist
136
activity in a world in which communication increasingly occurs online.

B.

Government Interest in Preventing and Investigating Crime

An important part of law enforcement is undeniably the ability to
investigate and prevent crime through lawful use of wiretap and
surveillance capabilities. As the world has transitioned to a significant
portion of all communications occurring on the Internet, federal law
enforcement and national security officials argue that their ability to
wiretap is “‘going dark’ as people increasingly communicate online instead
of by telephone.”137 The Internet has been increasingly used by criminals
and terrorists for the very purpose of avoiding surveillance by law

135. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3.
136. See Editorial, supra note 68.
137. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3.
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enforcement, and the inability of the FBI to wiretap adequately has led to
some situations in which potentially preventable crimes occurred.
One example that has been widely reported in the media is that some
of the September 11th hijackers may have used public computers in Florida
138
and New Jersey to access the Internet and communicate with each other.
Two of the hijackers used a state college library in New Jersey to review
139
and order airline tickets on the flight that crashed into the Pentagon.
Wisconsin Representative James Sensenbrenner, Jr., saying that it puts
Americans’ lives at risk, argued that such places should not be permitted to
be sanctuaries for terrorists to operate.140
In 2010, an investigation into a drug cartel failed because the
smugglers used peer-to-peer software that was tough to intercept, and,
141
instead, the investigators had to install equipment in a suspect’s office.
142
The delay “prevented the interception of pertinent communications.” In
her statement to the House Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism
and Homeland Security on February 17, 2011, Valerie E. Caproni
discussed two other situations that occurred recently, where the
government was unable to gain more information on suspects because of
the inability of the FBI to wiretap their communications.143 One example
was that the Drug Enforcement Agency, in an investigation of the leader of
a criminal organization involved in cocaine smuggling, realized that the
suspect was a former law enforcement officer who “went to great lengths to
utilize communications services that lacked intercept solutions,” and the
government was unable to obtain enough information through other
techniques.144 Caproni’s other example was a child prostitution case, in
138. Martin, supra note 10, at 153–54 (footnote omitted); 9/11 Hijackers Used Public
Libraries, WASH. TIMES, April 28, 2005, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2005/apr/28/20050428-115527-9817r/; Sue Anne Pressley & Justin Blum, Hijackers
May Have Accessed Computers at Public Libraries; Authorities Investigating Possible
Internet Communications, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2001, at A04, available at
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/80829842.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=
ABS:FT&date=Sep+17%2C+2001&author=Sue+Anne+Pressley+and+Justin+Blum&pub=
The+Washington+Post&edition=&startpage=A.04&desc=Hijackers+May+Have+Accessed
+Computers+at+Public+Libraries%3B+Authorities+Investigating+Possible+Internet+Com
munications.
139. 9/11 Hijackers Used Public Libraries, supra note 138.
140. Id.
141. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3.
142. Id.
143. See Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Valerie Caproni, General Counsel,
FBI), http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Caproni02172011.pdf [hereinafter Hearing].
144. Hearing, supra note 143, at 2.
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which a social networking site used by the suspect did not have wiretap
capabilities, and the FBI argued that although it was able to prosecute, the
case was weaker and the resulting sentence was lighter than it may have
been otherwise.145 Due to the increasing communication over the Internet
by criminals and terrorists, the government argues that the expansion of
CALEA is necessary to maintain public safety and national security.
Although the government argues its surveillance capabilities are
disappearing, in 2009, law enforcement agencies utilized a record 2,376
146
wiretaps, each yielding an average of 3,763 intercepted communications.
Privacy advocates argue that these numbers suggest that the FBI is
“experiencing a boon in electronic surveillance” rather than being thwarted
by technological barriers.147

C.

Current Retrofit Services Delay Ability to Wiretap

The FBI and federal officials argue that the CALEA proposal should
also move forward due to the problems that the government faces using old
methods of wiretapping over the Internet. In many cases, if the FBI wants
to wiretap a suspect who is using the Internet, it must retrofit a
communications network, which can delay the process for months.148
When a service is encrypted, sometimes even the provider cannot
unscramble it, which prevents federal agents from obtaining
communications at all.149 Officials disagree with the allegation that
installing access points will create weaknesses that would then be used by
hackers to view the same information that the government is gathering.
Instead, the government argues that building interception capability into
service providers is less likely to “inadvertently create security holes than
retrofitting it after receiving a wiretap order.”150
In response to the accusation that the expansion of CALEA would be
a serious threat to innovation, government officials point out that the same
fear was prevalent when CALEA was first enacted in 1994 and that critics
argued that the law would “impede cellphone innovation, but that
151
Government officials, therefore,
technology continued to improve.”
argue that the CALEA expansion is necessary to maintain their ability to
145. Id.
146. FBI Seeks New Mandates on Communications Technologies, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY
& TECH. (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.cdt.org/policy/fbi-seeks-new-mandatescommunications-technologies.
147. Id.
148. Savage Sept. 27, supra note 3.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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conduct law enforcement and maintain national security in the best
interests of the American people.

VII. MORE INFORMATION REQUIRED TO BALANCE COMPETING
INTERESTS ADEQUATELY
The Obama administration’s proposal to expand CALEA to enable
the FBI to require all communications services to be wiretap-capable has
created debate over whether government interests would truly be met, and
whether government interests outweigh the opposing concerns. As there are
a number of competing interests on both sides of the debate, and significant
factors indicate that the detrimental nature of a CALEA expansion would
outweigh the government’s interests, more information should be provided
before any further steps are taken.

A.

Competing Interests

The proposed legislation is representative of the strengthening
relationship between the government and the private sector with regard to
the Internet. The FBI cooperates extensively with networks as it is, and the
proposals would advance this relationship further. This has created fear
among some that the relationship will become a threat to the online
environment.152
Other concerns regarding the expansion of CALEA include the fear
that it will chill online speech that has a positive impact on society and that
153
it will threaten valued American privacy. Further reservations have been
voiced regarding the negative impact CALEA would have on the aspects of
154
The
Internet structure which contribute to its economic fruitfulness.
design of the Internet would also be a problem for national security reasons
as the software, which would be introduced for networks to comply with
CALEA, could introduce vulnerabilities into the system that could be
abused by hackers to access critical data. There are also misgivings about
the software that would be created to wiretap the Internet because of the
potential consequences it could have in the hands of repressive regimes and
the harm it could cause to foreign corporations.155
The government argues that CALEA should be expanded because it is
not an extension of current government authority to wiretap under the law
152. Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 28, at para. 3.
153. Horn, supra note 112, at 750 (quoting Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First
Amendment: Unraveling the ‘Chilling Effect,’ 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693–700 (1978)).
154. Editorial, supra note 68.
155. Wiretapping and Other Eavesdropping Devices and Methods, supra note 1; Savage
Nov. 16, supra note 17.
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and it would advance significant state interests.
Emphasizing the
importance of being able to wiretap in order to prevent and investigate
crime, the FBI argues that there have been times that crimes have occurred
when it could have been prevented had the capabilities to intercept Internet
157
communications been available. The FBI also argues that the potential
for vulnerabilities to be exposed to hackers are even greater if the services
have to be retrofitted rather than introduced through CALEA software.158

B.

Lack of Information

In spite of these relevant government interests, the disparity between
the arguments remains too large to justify the current expansion of
CALEA. Along with the numerous critiques of the Obama administration’s
proposal to expand CALEA is the point that there is little public data about
the frequency with which “court-approved surveillance is frustrated
because of a service’s technical design.”159 The ACLU argued in front of
the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland
Security on February 17, 2011 that the expansion of the government’s
ability to wiretap the Internet is unnecessary because “[t]he number of
wiretap orders the government seeks every year is a matter of public record
and that record does not support this level of privacy invasion.”160 In the
2009 Wiretap Report, there were only thirty-two computer wiretap orders
161
For the one encrypted
and only one encrypted communication order.
communication order, law enforcement eventually gained access to the
162
clear text of the communication.
At the same hearing in front of the House Judiciary Subcommittee,
the General Counsel of the FBI, Valerie E. Caproni, made updated
statements about the intentions of the government with regard to the
163
Caproni announced that in the 2012
proposed expansion in the law.
fiscal year, the government intends to establish a Domestic
Communications Assistance Center (“DCAC”) which would “leverage the
research and development efforts of Federal, State, and local law
enforcement with respect to electronic surveillance capabilities, facilitate
the sharing of technology between law enforcement agencies, advance

156.
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160.
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initiatives to implement solutions complying with CALEA, and seek to
build more effective relations with the communications industry.”164
Caproni also stated that the government “does not have a formal
position . . . on whether any legislative changes are necessary,” appearing
to be possibly retreating from previous statements made by the
165
Whether there is a formal position or not, the
administration.
government has been moving toward a legislative change, and Caproni
herself said that the Obama administration is looking forward to working
with Congress to find a solution.166 Documents obtained through a
Freedom of Information Act request by the Electronic Frontier Foundation
also demonstrate that “the FBI and Justice Department have been working
on amendments to CALEA since 2006 and have been lobbying Congress
167
and the White House to support it.”
The potential consequences of what could occur in the wake of a
CALEA expansion, therefore, seem unjustified. Before enacting any new
CALEA provisions into law, Congress should strongly consider whether
the changes are truly necessary or whether the current capabilities of the
168
As discussed, there are
FBI to wiretap Internet users are sufficient.
competing interests that need to be taken into account, but since the FBI
has not given substantial information about the reasons that these broad
changes are needed, significantly more data should be gathered in order to
best address these interests before CALEA is expanded.

C.

Moving Forward

In order to balance the interests at hand more effectively, the creation
of the DCAC, as discussed by Valerie Caproni, could gather further
information about why exactly the change of CALEA is required for
government interests to be met. This information should then be given to
Congress and the American public, before further legislative action occurs,
to ensure that additional Internet wiretapping capabilities for the
government are truly necessary. The information gathered by the DCAC
could be delivered in a method similar to the yearly Wiretap Report,
providing transparency for the American public to track the extent to which
their communications are being monitored. All that would be required on
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Eric W. Dolan, FBI Urges Congress to Expand Internet Wiretapping, THE RAW
STORY (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/02/17/fbi-urges-congress-toexpand-internet-wiretapping.
168. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 68.
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such a report is the raw data, as it would be unwise to include specific
examples that could lead suspects to realize that they are under government
surveillance. The DCAC should work with the FBI to create such a report
to demonstrate the extent to which government efforts to prevent and
investigate crime have been foiled by the failure to wiretap Internet
communications. Whether the government would have had the ability to
get the information through other legitimate means when compiling the
report should also be taken into account.
As the proposed DCAC is also suggested to “leverage existing
169
the
research and development efforts of federal law enforcement,”
DCAC could conceivably work to develop advanced technology that would
avoid the current dangers from inserting access points into the existing
Internet structure. If these proposed objectives are satisfied, the DCAC
itself might assist in confronting some of the current dangers surrounding
an expansion of CALEA. Landau and the Internet Engineering Task Force
(“IETF”), an “international community of researchers who seek to provide
standards to the evolution of the Internet’s architecture,” agree that the
design of a “more secure Internet amenable to law enforcement purposes”
could be plausible.170 Their present concerns are focused on inserting
access points in the Internet as it is presently structured and the “inherent
security problems it would create.”171
With systems as they currently exist and the information currently
provided, it does not appear that the government could provide a strong
enough argument for Internet wiretapping capabilities to outweigh the
prevailing interests of the American public. The expansion of CALEA
would partially infringe on the constitutionally provided First and Fourth
Amendment freedoms and would create problems for industry development
and national security. The government has a high burden of proof to
demonstrate that such risks would be worth extending CALEA wiretapping
to all Internet communications. The handful of examples provided by the
government thus far should not be found by Congress to be worth
justifying the expansion. The FBI and the Obama administration should,
therefore, reconsider their proposal in light of the potential threats their
actions could have on the security and well-being of the American public.

169. U.S. Department of Justice FY 2012 Budget Request, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2012factsheets/docs/fy12-national-security.pdf.
170. Park, supra note 74, at 618–19. Landau in fact supported the funding for the DCAC
when Caproni introduced it at the February 17, 2011 hearing. FBI Seeks New Mandates on
Communications Technologies, supra note 146.
171. Park, supra note 74, at 619.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Although a formal proposal has yet to be introduced, the American
public should be wary of the steps that the government is taking to extend
wiretapping capabilities to all Internet communications. While the
government argues that it has been losing the opportunity to obtain
valuable information about suspects who violate the law due to their
communication through the use of Facebook, Skype, and BlackBerry, there
are noteworthy hazards which could arise through an expansion of
CALEA. Threats to constitutional rights and national security are
ultimately what our country faces if the Obama administration and the FBI
are successful in their attempts to create Internet access points that could be
manipulated by our enemies.
The looming fears surrounding the potential amendment of CALEA
are substantively justified and demonstrate that there is much that needs to
be addressed before Congress takes steps that potentially put our country in
danger. The FBI should, therefore, utilize the soon-to-be created DCAC to
gather more data to support the government’s allegations that it is missing
out on collecting critical information due to its inability to wiretap some
Internet communications. Once this information is gathered, it is still likely
that a realistic evaluation of competing interests will show that there is
entirely too much at stake to allow the government to wiretap the Internet.

